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TREATY INTERPRETATION: RULE OF POLITICS 
OVER RULE OF LAW? 
Lisa Baldez* 
GREGORY H. FOX, PAUL R. DUBINSKY AND BRAD R. ROTH, EDS., SUPREME LAW 
OF THE LAND? DEBATING THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS OF TREATIES 
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2017). PP. 514. HARDCOVER $91.35. PAPERBACK $44.99. 
 
DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2016). PP. 472. 
HARDCOVER $95.00. 
Americans are currently living in a moment of extreme hostility toward international 
law. Under the Trump Administration, the United States government has pulled out of 
major international agreements (including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 
Iran’s nuclear program and the Paris Agreement on climate change) on the grounds that 
they were “bad deals” for the American people. The U.S. has withdrawn from the U.N. 
Human Rights Council and has threatened to withdraw from the World Trade 
Organization. These moves reflect deep antipathy for international law and a belief that 
adherence to international agreements compromises American interests. The overarching 
view is articulated in a draft executive order that, if enacted, would issue a moratorium on 
multilateral treaties: “[T]hese types of treaties are . . . used to force countries to adhere to 
often radical domestic agendas that could not, themselves, otherwise be enacted with a 
country’s domestic laws.”1 This understanding of treaties—that they impose policies that 
a country would not otherwise adopt—has undergirded conservative thinking since the 
creation of the United Nations. Conservative Republicans have sought to thwart American 
                                                          
*   Professor of Government and Latin American, Latino and Caribbean Studies at Dartmouth College. Her 
most recent book, Defying Convention: U.S. Resistance to the U.N. Treaty on Women’s Rights (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), examines the battles over ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women in the United States. 
 1. Courtenay R. Conrad & Emily Ritter, A Trump Moratorium on International Treaties Could Roll Back 
Human Rights – Here at Home, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/03/01/a-trump-moratorium-on-international-treaties-could-roll-back-human-rights-here-at-home/ 
?utm_term=.0a6427817919 (Mar. 1, 2017). 
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engagement with treaties, human rights treaties in particular, in many ways since then, 
from proposing constitutional amendments that would ban ratification of human rights 
treaties to grassroots mobilization opposing the appointment of Supreme Court justices 
hostile to international law.2 What impact have these efforts had on treaty law in the United 
States? Are treaties still the “supreme law of the land” as Article VI of the Constitution 
avers? These two books offer rich responses to these questions. 
A key issue at the center of both books is whether or not treaties are presumed to be 
self-executing, in terms of automatically entering into force upon ratification. They both 
concur that contemporary jurisprudence maintains that self-execution is optional.3 As of 
today, treaties do not automatically supersede conflicting state law. Their relationship to 
conflicting state law depends on whether they are self-executing and automatically enter 
into force, or non-self-executing and thus requiring domestic legislation in order to be 
implemented.4 
Fox, Dubinsky and Roth, and the authors of the chapters in the edited volume, accept 
as given the “optional” aspect of self-execution and focus on the implications of that 
interpretation. They pose the erosion of treaty supremacy as a question (indicated by the 
question mark in the title Supreme Law of the Land?) and examine the degree to which it 
can be said to exist across a range of legal issues. For Sloss, on the other hand, current 
interpretations of treaty doctrine break with historical precedent and rest on incorrect 
interpretations of the law.5 A precipitous change in the interpretation of treaty law occurred 
in the postwar era and this change represents the death of treaty supremacy (hence the 
eponymous title, The Death of Treaty Supremacy).6 
As an edited volume, Supreme Law of the Land? is organized around a series of 
questions about treaty supremacy. Each of the authors focus on the significance of the 
Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations law of the United States for various legal 
issues.7 The editors take the Third Restatement as a baseline and seek to determine 
“whether developments since 1987 have affirmed the Restatement rules, modified them in 
some discernible fashion, or abandoned them altogether,”8 with the intention of providing 
“as complete a record as possible of the Third Restatement’s impact or lack thereof” and 
thus influencing the drafting of the Fourth Restatement, which is now in process.9 When 
                                                          
 2. Mark Weston Janis & Noam Wiener, Treaties in U.S. Law from the Founding to the Restatement (Third), 
in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND? 15, 48–50 (Gregory H. Fox et al. eds., 2017). 
 3. DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY 5 (2016); David P. Stewart, Recent Trends in U.S. 
Treaty Implementation, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 228, 229, 234–36. 
 4. Stewart, supra note 3, at 250. 
 5. SLOSS, supra note 3, at 310–18. 
 6. Id. at 5–6. 
 7. Restatements are a legal resource created by the American Law Institute to be used by lawyers and judges. 
They summarize existing case law into a comprehensive body of knowledge. As the ALI website affirms, “[t]hey 
aim at clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently 
stands or might appropriately be stated by a court.” Frequently Asked Questions, ALI., https://www.ali.org 
/publications/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). The First Restatement was completed in 
1944, the Second in 1965 and the Third in 1987. The ALI is currently in the process of drafting the Fourth 
Restatement. 
 8. Gregory H. Fox, Paul R. Dubinsky & Brad R. Roth, Introduction, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra 
note 2, at 1, 4. 
 9. Id. at 14. 
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it comes to treaty law, one of the main guidelines that the Third Restatement affirms is the 
doctrine of self-execution: treaties are generally considered to automatically determine 
domestic law, unless stated otherwise.10 What the authors find across a range of areas is 
that this basic premise of the Third Restatement has, for the most part, not been heeded by 
case law. 
In general, the authors in this volume have a sanguine view of the Third Restatement. 
As the editors affirm, “the treaty norms of the Third Restatement were almost entirely 
uncontroversial during their drafting and were received largely without critical rebuke by 
federal courts and leading scholars.”11 In Chapter 2, Gregory H. Fox presents empirical 
evidence that supports this view. Fox finds no evidence of dispute over the question of 
self-execution during the process of drafting the Restatement, in the court cases that 
followed the Third Restatement or in scholarly analysis in the ten years following its 
adoption.12 Nonetheless, as the chapters of this study unfold, it becomes clear that the 
Third Restatement has been honored more in the breach when it comes to the question of 
self-execution. 
The book begins with a sweeping historical overview of U.S. treaty law starting with 
the Founding. In the introductory chapter, Mark Janis and Noam Wiener highlight the 
impact of political and historical context on the ways that treaties have been understood 
and implemented over time, starting with the creation of the republic.13 They argue that 
domestic treaty obligations have waxed and waned over time depending on the nature of 
the relationship between the federal government and the states.14 They highlight historical 
continuity in the way that race has often been at the center of disputes over the jurisdiction 
of treaties.15 The emphasis on historical continuity and ambivalence about changes in 
treaty law differs markedly from the perspective offered by Sloss, who interprets 
contemporary treaty law as the result of a decisive and deeply problematic shift.16 
In Chapter 3, Paul R. Dubinsky describes the history of treaty interpretation in terms 
of three analogies. The vision of “treaty as contract” viewed treaties in terms of private 
law; this perspective helped to establish the U.S. as a legitimate and equal partner vis-à-
vis foreign powers at the time of the Founding.17 As the substance of treaties expanded 
beyond commerce and property rights, a second understanding of “treaty as statute” 
emerged, which allowed more room for interpretation about what a treaty entailed and 
viewed treaties more like pieces of legislation.18 These two views of treaties existed side 
by side for two hundred years.19 In the wake of the Third Restatement—as well as 
subsequent decisions that ignored the Third Restatement—a third model emerged, “treaty 
                                                          
 10. Ingrid Wuerth, Self-Execution, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 148, 148–49. 
 11. Fox et al., supra note 8, at 5. 
 12. Gregory H. Fox, Treaties in the Third Restatement, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 55, 
91. 
 13. Janis & Wiener, supra note 2, at 15. 
 14. Id. at 54. 
 15. Id. at 46. 
 16. SLOSS, supra note 3, at 1–5. 
 17. Paul Dubinsky, Competing Models for Treaty Interpretation, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra 
note 2, at 92, 99–106. 
 18. Id. at 106–15. 
 19. Id. at 92–96. 
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as delegation.”20 Dubinsky finds this contemporary mode of thinking problematic in part 
because Congress rarely actually explicitly delegates the power to interpret treaties to the 
executive branch and, moreover, this vision of treaties is not grounded in law but in 
political imperatives.21 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,  treaty interpretation has been guided by 
the policy priorities of the executive branch rather than the rule of law—and thus has 
departed from the Third Restatement.22 
In Chapter 4, Ingrid Wuerth examines the doctrine of self-execution in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas.23 She finds that the presumption of 
non-self-execution that has increasingly guided the interpretation of human rights treaties 
has bled over to other types of treaties—particularly those regarding “property, contract 
and commercial rights.”24 Wuerth sees this trend as potentially “undermin[ing] the 
domestic enforcement of treaties long understood to be directly enforceable in U.S. 
courts.”25 She holds both Medellín and the Third Restatement responsible here, on the 
grounds that they both offer contradictory guidance on self-execution. The majority 
opinion in Medellín stipulated that decisions made by the International Court of Justice are 
non-self-executing in the U.S. The U.S. is therefore obliged to comply with international 
law—but that obligation does not automatically require domestic action. Whether or not it 
does depends on the “intent of U.S. treaty makers” (166). This raises of series of questions 
for Wuerth: Is there a presumption of non-self-execution? What aspects of the text of a 
treaty are dispositive in determining self-execution? How should domestic courts interpret 
non-self-executing agreements? She concludes that the justices addressed the question of 
self-execution explicitly but in ways that have sown confusion. 
Margaret McGuinness’s chapter traces the history of the relationship between 
federalism and treaties, highlighting the central tension that exists between the federal 
government’s ability to make and uphold international agreements, and limits on the 
ability of the federal government to impose authority over states.26 She argues that federal 
treaty making power, especially as affirmed in Missouri v. Holland, has not substantially 
violated state autonomy and that concerns about whether the “U.S. [is] a significantly less 
reliable treaty partner” are unwarranted.27 As McGuinness puts it, Missouri v. Holland “is 
often described as standing for the basic proposition that the national government can do 
through treaty what it otherwise may not do through national legislation.”28 As 
McGuinness notes, however, this fear has not been realized; the federal government has 
not exercised the power to impose international law on states and localities, as critics of 
                                                          
 20. Id. at 145. 
 21. Id. at 145–47. 
 22. Dubinsky, supra note 17, at 134 (discussing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc.,  467 
U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)). 
 23. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 24. Wuerth, supra note 10, at 177. 
 25. Id. at 149. 
 26. See Margaret E. McGuiness, Treaties, Federalism, and the Contested Legacy of Missouri v. Holland, in 
SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 179. 
 27. Id. at 226. 
 28. Id. at 195. 
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss2/3
BALDEZ, L-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2019  3:12 PM 
2019] TREATY INTERPRETATION 215 
Missouri vs. Holland feared.29 Instead, the executive branch has acceded to reservations, 
understandings and declarations (RUDs) that limit the domestic application of 
international law.30 She is sanguine about new federalist approaches to treaties, arguing 
that RUDs are a viable way to balance U.S. commitments to international human rights 
law because they facilitate U.S. ratification while allowing a range of local and state 
responses to treaty obligations.31 
Much of the political struggle over treaties rests on an assumption that self-executing 
treaties differ from non-self-executing ones.32 In Chapter 6, David P. Stewart subjects the 
concept of self-execution to scrutiny and finds that, since the 1980s, very few treaties of 
the treaties deemed self-executing have actually been free of implementing legislation. 
Regardless of the type of treaty, “the majority . . . denominated ‘self-executing’ actually 
rest upon, and are effectively implemented by, existing legislation.”33 Moreover, the 
empirical record does not support the Third Restatement assumption that self-executing 
treaties are more efficient in terms of clarity, speed or scope of compliance.34 He seeks to 
identify patterns in the conditions under which implementing legislation is required, and 
what that legislation entails—but finds no systematic explanations.35 Overlapping 
domestic law almost always renders treaty implementation a complex process that requires 
some implementing legislation: “in an increasingly multilateral world, treaty compliance 
is an ongoing task, not a ‘one and done’ undertaking that ends at ratification.”36 Thus, 
Stewart’s analysis suggests that “self-execution” is really a misnomer—a legal fiction.37 
Much of the attention to treaties focus on Article II treaties, those signed by the 
president and approved by a Senate supermajority.38 Michael D. Ramsey’s chapter 
reminds us that there are other kinds of international agreements, with Article II treaties 
representing “only a tiny fraction” of the international agreements to which the U.S. is a 
party—just 12% from 1980 to 2000.39 He maintains that “there is no satisfactory 
explanation for why some agreements are made one way and some in others,” with the 
exception of international trade deals which almost always take the form of Congressional-
Executive agreements.40 In terms of sheer numbers, if not importance, most international 
agreements are made solely by the president. Both Stewart’s and Ramsey’s chapters 
suggest opportunities for further research. Quantitative analysis would be well suited for 
testing their conclusions that there are no systematic patterns in whether implementing 
legislation or why international agreements take the form they do.41 
                                                          
 29. See McGuiness, supra note 26, at 195–213. 
 30. Id. at 190. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 229. 
 33. Id. at 271. 
 34. Stewart, supra note 3, at 233. 
 35. Id. at 234–36. 
 36. Id. at 281. 
 37. Id. at 280. 
 38. Michael D. Ramsey, The Treaty and Its Rivals: Making International Agreements in U.S. Law and 
Practice, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 282. 
 39. Id. at 283. 
 40. Id. at 284. 
 41. See Stewart, supra note 3; Ramsey, supra note 38. 
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In Chapter 8, Roger P. Alford explores the role of courts in enforcing treaties and 
discusses four ways in which the power of courts to adjudicate treaties has been 
constrained.42 Pursuant to Medellín, there is a presumption that private actors lack legal 
standing when it comes to international treaties, and thus cannot invoke treaty rights in a 
court of law.43 The “last-in-time” rule suggests that, in the case of overlapping jurisdiction 
or conflict between a treaty and a domestic statute, the more recently approved one takes 
precedence; this rule limits court jurisdiction.44 If an issue is deemed a “political question,” 
then it cannot be subject to interpretation by the court—but the conditions under which 
this holds are unclear.45 Alford finds the criteria that have been applied to designate a 
question political to be “malleable,” “ambiguous,” “inconsistent,” and “unpredictable.”46 
Finally, international treaties, and particularly human rights treaties, increasingly rely on 
RUDs that “preclude the direct application of international law.”47 Alford acknowledges 
the pros and cons of these restrictions. RUDs, for example, are a way of brokering  
compromise between internationalists and isolationists, allowing the U.S. to comply with 
human rights standards without “the direct application of international law.”48 But 
ultimately Alford finds these trends troubling in terms of the importance of upholding and 
hewing to international legal obligations.49 
Geoffrey S. Corn and Dru Brenner-Beck’s chapter provides a case study of the way 
treaty interpretation has played out with regard to the law of armed conflict (LOAC).50 
They illustrate significant moments in LOAC with regard to the role that Congress, the 
executive and courts have played in interpreting the Geneva Conventions and the Chemical 
Warfare Convention in particular.51 Consistent with other chapters’ emphasis on political 
considerations, they maintain that “the Senate’s decision to consent to treaty obligations 
will often fluctuate based on the broader national sense of geostrategic necessity.”52 They 
provide a detailed analysis of historical examples to show that both executive and 
congressional support are necessary for the ratification of international treaties.53 
Corn and Brenner-Beck’s analysis stands out within this volume in its reference to 
the significance of a denial of cert.54 Most of the other chapters focus primarily on cases 
that were granted cert and are thus potentially biased in terms of case selection.55 When 
he was released from prison after serving a seventeen-year term, Panamanian General 
                                                          
 42. See Roger P. Alford, Judicial Barriers to the Enforcement of Treaties, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, 
supra note 2, at 333. 
 43. Id. at 336–37. 
 44. Id. at 339. 
 45. Id. at 343. 
 46. Id. at 346–47. 
 47. Alford, supra note 42, at 354. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See generally Alford, supra note 42. 
 50. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Dru Brenner-Beck, Case Study No. 1: Exploring U.S. Treaty Practice Through 
a Military Lens, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 358. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 362. 
 53. Id. at 363. 
 54. Id. at 383. 
 55. See generally SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?. 
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Manuel Noriega petitioned the Supreme Court to determine whether France’s extradition 
request violated his rights as a prisoner of war under the Third Geneva Convention.56 The 
Supreme Court refused to hear the case—but Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on the 
denial of cert on the grounds that hearing the case would resolve lingering questions about 
self-execution.57 Inclusion of cases that were denied cert provides one way to strengthen 
the validity of claims about the conditions that shape treaty interpretation. 
In Chapter 10, Paul Dubinsky provides a second case study that traces the rise of the 
United States as a global leader in the area of private international law (PIL).58 In the 
postwar era, the U.S. became a major economic power but lacked the legal infrastructure 
to support globalization.59 Starting in the 1960s, the U.S. sought to address this lacuna by 
joining a large number of private international law treaties in a short period of time.60 
Engagement with these treaties imposed costs—”real requirements and limitations”—on 
state courts, yet the predominant focus on interstate trade ensured that these efforts 
generated “no significant opposition.”61 By the 1980s, the U.S. had become a leader in 
this arena.62 The expansion of issues addressed by PIL in the 1980s raised federalist 
concerns about state interests and prompted a retraction of American leadership, a trend 
that Dubinsky finds troubling on the grounds that U.S. participation strengthens the PIL 
regime overall.63 
In the concluding chapter, Gary Born highlights the theme of American ambivalence 
about treaties.64 As Born observes, “the United States appears simultaneously both to 
value and to devalue treaties.”65 He maintains that this ambivalence has shown remarkable 
continuity over time: “misgivings of almost exactly the same sort have been a recurrent 
feature of U.S. law and politics since the earliest days of the Republic.”66 The authors in 
this volume are also ambivalent about contemporary treaty interpretation, with some 
expressing concern and others more sanguine about the degree to which federalism has 
reshaped understandings of American treaty obligations.67 
A certain amount of ambivalence is appropriate for an edited volume that represents 
the views of many different scholars. In The Death of Treaty Supremacy, however, David 
Sloss is neither ambivalent nor sanguine about the current status of treaties in the U.S. 
Sloss makes four main points in this book.68 First, current treaty law entails a presumption 
of non-self-execution, but it has mistakenly fused the doctrine of treaty supremacy with 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 382. 
 57. Id. at 383. 
 58. Dubinsky, supra note 17, at 411–60. 
 59. Id. at 413. 
 60. Id. at 415. 
 61. Id. at 422–23. 
 62. See Dubinsky, supra note 17, at 430–35. 
 63. See id. at 435–38. 
 64. Gary B. Born, Conclusion: Treaties as the Law of the Land: Change and Continuity, in SUPREME LAW 
OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 461, 463. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 469. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See SLOSS, supra note 3. 
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the doctrine of self-execution.69 Second, from the Founding of the republic until World 
War II, these two doctrines operated completely separately from one another, and should 
be separated today.70 Third, the fusion of the doctrines of treaty supremacy and self-
execution occurred in the wake of the formation of the United Nations and the global 
embrace of international agreements that recast racial discrimination as a matter of foreign 
policy.71 American conservatives saw the United Nations Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as threats and they reacted by seeking to curtail the power 
of treaties to affect domestic policy.72 What resulted, Sloss argues, was legal doctrine 
based on political preferences rather than sound legal precedent.73 Fourth, this change, a 
radical departure from two hundred years of precedent, is an invisible constitutional 
change that occurred without the American people weighing in on its consequences for the 
protection of their human rights.74 
The first half of the book is devoted to demonstrating the status of treaty supremacy 
doctrine.75 Sloss’s main argument here is that the presumption of non-self-execution as 
applied to treaty law is a relatively new phenomenon in the history of the country’s 
constitutional jurisprudence.76 As he puts it, “from the Founding until World War II, treaty 
supremacy cases and self-execution cases proceeded along two independent, non-
intersecting paths.”77 The section on the establishment of treaty supremacy during the 
Founding is relatively short because, Sloss maintains, scholars do not dispute the status of 
treaty supremacy during that time period. Sloss dedicates considerably more effort to the 
period from 1800 to 1945.78 The exhaustive documentation that he provides here aims to 
demonstrate that treaties were simply assumed to be self-executing; the question of the 
relationship between self-execution and treaty supremacy was rarely even mentioned.79 
The evidence here challenges the effort by conservative legal scholars to claim historical 
precedent for non-self-execution doctrine prior to 1945.80 One of the cases that Sloss 
analyzes is Foster v. Neilson, the case that many scholars point to as the basis of NSE 
doctrine.81 The analysis delves deeply into the details of the historical context in which 
the case occurred.82 He maintains that those who view Foster as the basis for NSE doctrine 
rely on a “mythical view” of the case, based on cherry-picking language from that case, 
taking it out of context of the rest of the decision and inflating the significance of a single 
passage that appears at the tail end of a decision (i.e., “the sixty-first page of a sixty-four 
                                                          
 69. See id. at 1–13. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. at 204. 
 73. See SLOSS, supra note 3, 204–08. 
 74. See id. at 1–13. 
 75. See id. at 17–169. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 265. 
 78. See SLOSS, supra note 3, 67–169. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. at 129. 
 81. Id. at 67. 
 82. See id. at 67–84. 
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page decision”).83 
From Sloss’s perspective, the self-execution doctrine was clear and unequivocal 
from the Founding to the postwar era.84 Moreover, it constituted “good law,” founded on 
solid legal principles and precedent.85 As Sloss shows in exhaustive detail, treaty 
supremacy is relevant only in cases where treaty law conflicts with state law.86 For most 
of history, this is how treaty supremacy was understood. After 1965, however, judges 
began to invoke the doctrine of treaty supremacy in cases involving the relationship 
between treaties and the federal government and/or Congress’s regulatory power despite 
the fact that these relationships are not governed by Article VI of the Constitution and thus 
ought not to be relevant to treaty supremacy.87 The Genocide Convention provides one 
simple example. Legislators have insisted that the Genocide Convention and other human 
rights agreements are not self-executing, but Sloss dismisses this claim as based on a 
misapprehension of the law: “[t]he Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule means that treaties 
supersede conflicting state laws. The only type of state law that would present a genuine 
conflict with the Genocide Convention would be one authorizing genocide.”88 As Sloss 
points out, there are no state laws governing genocide. 
For two hundred years, treaty supremacy and self-execution never came up in the 
same legal cases: “in cases where one party alleged a conflict between a treaty and state 
law, the question of whether the treaty was self-executing was almost never raised.”89 
Self-execution doctrine was developed to address questions about the implementation of 
treaties “that regulate matters within the scope of Congress’s legislative powers” and was 
not relevant to treaties that addressed laws that fell within the jurisdiction of individual 
states.90 To provide an example: if a treaty requires an appropriation of funds, then it must 
stipulate a self-executing clause directing Congress to appropriate those funds, consistent 
with separation of powers among the branches of government.91 Few cases are ever this 
simple—and Sloss patiently walks through the logic of innumerable, more complex cases 
to illustrate that clear distinctions existed between the proper application of treaty 
supremacy (relating to states) and self-execution (relating to separation of powers).92 
In Part Three, Sloss traces the gradual process by which the doctrines of treaty 
supremacy and non-self-execution became enmeshed with one another.93 He bases his 
claims on a detailed analysis of Supreme Court decisions and lower court cases, scholarly 
commentary and the drafting of the Second Restatement.94 Sloss argues that the doctrine 
of non-self-execution emerged as a conservative reaction to the “magnetic pull of 
                                                          
 83. SLOSS, supra note 3, at 67. 
 84. Id. at 59‒66. 
 85. Id. at 1‒5. 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 72. 
 87. Id. at 6‒8. 
 88. SLOSS, supra note 3, at 205. 
 89. Id. at 60. 
 90. Id. at 3. 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 72. 
 92. See id. at 129‒52. 
 93. See SLOSS, supra note 3, at 181‒284. 
 94. Id. 
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international human rights norms.”95 
Do international human rights treaties bestow individuals with rights that can be 
invoked in domestic courts of law? This emerged as a pressing issue in the midst of the 
creation of the United Nations, when African American organizations envisioned the 
fledgling institution as a place to redress racial discrimination—and American 
conservatives reacted by seeking to limit the U.N.’s power over domestic policy.96 Sloss’s 
account examines the legal consequences of this political conflict. Given the doctrine of 
treaty supremacy as it was then understood, the U.N. treaties should have superseded 
conflicting state law—but the prospect of overturning state laws governing the rights of 
individual citizens proved untenable for many policymakers.97 A new interpretation of 
treaty supremacy emerged as a compromise: treaties do not necessarily supersede 
conflicting local law unless the treaty is self-executing.98 This interpretation has evolved 
over time, but is the current standard defining the relationship between international 
treaties and domestic law.99 
What happened in the postwar era? The prohibition on racial discrimination in two 
of the founding documents of the U.N.—the Charter and the UDHR—prompted a 
conservative reaction in the U.S. in which lawmakers sought to limit their domestic 
effect.100 John Bricker, a Republican Senator from Ohio, and Frank Holman, president of 
the American Bar Association, spearheaded this effort.101 In response to this conservative 
reaction, the threat of a constitutional amendment that would prevent the president from 
signing human rights treaties, and the prospect of international law overshadowing the 
Constitution on the issue of human rights (and racial discrimination in particular), the 
doctrine of treaty supremacy was reinterpreted. As a result, the issue of treaty supremacy 
became decoupled from the doctrine of self-execution, paving the way for self-execution 
to become optional.102 
This change took a while to register in case law. Cases taken on and opinions 
rendered by the Supreme Court in the ensuing decade do not reflect the NSE exception, 
and there is only mixed evidence that the change mattered in lower federal and state courts 
initially.103 Not until the American Law Institute (ALI) endorsed it in the Second 
Restatement did this change become evident in case law.104 To illustrate this gap, Sloss 
describes in detail a series of cases in which the U.N. Charter had obvious relevance to the 
legal issue at hand but was not mentioned in the opinion—notably Brown v. Board of 
Education.105 He argues that the Supreme Court did not mention the U.N. Charter in these 
cases because the justices realized that doing so would have tacitly acknowledged that it 
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provided a stronger defense of rights than did the U.S. Constitution.106 Moreover, the self-
execution question did not come up in any of these cases.107 As a result, “as of 1948 the 
conceptual firewall that insulated treaty supremacy doctrine from self-execution doctrine 
remained largely intact.”108 
One important exception is Fujii v. California, which “is one of the few cases in 
which a U.S. court applied the Charter’s human rights provisions in conjunction with the 
Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule to invalidate a state law.”109 Senator Forrest Donnell, 
a Republican from Missouri, convened a debate on the floor of the Senate to discuss the 
Fujii case on April 28, 1950—four days after the decision had been handed down.110 This 
kind of attention to a pending decision by a lower court  was “extremely unusual.”111 
Donnell and others were concerned about the potential for Fujii to set a precedent for 
international human rights treaties overriding domestic law—with regard to racial 
discrimination, but also sex discrimination.112 Republican Senator Homer Ferguson from 
Michigan expressed concerns that Fujii implied that “the U.N. Charter ‘may . . . nullify or 
make void all statutes in any State in relation to distinctions made between the sexes.”113 
These concerns were prophetic for the time. Sloss claims that the basis for the Fujii 
decision cannot be found in law and contravenes 150 years of legal precedent of treaty 
supremacy.114 From his perspective, the decision in Fujii represents a solution to a 
political problem rather than a sound legal argument. The decision “enabl[ed] the U.S. 
political system to accommodate the demands of Bricker and his supporters without 
adopting a formal constitutional amendment.”115 This conflict prompted the treaty 
supremacy rule to become “‘unstuck’ from its traditional moorings.”116 
Sloss delves deeply into the details of the drafting of the Second Restatement to 
discover why that document codified an interpretation of law that contravened what had 
up to that point been an uncontroversial principle.117 Drawing on the archival records of 
the Ford Foundation and the American Law Institute, Sloss argues that the prior 
experiences of key decision makers shaped the drafting of the Second Restatement.118 
Particularly critical was the participation of a handful of ALI reporters who had worked in 
the State Department during the years of discussion of the Bricker Amendment; these men 
were keenly aware of the political conflicts that erupted over human rights treaties and 
eager to avoid them.119 As Sloss puts it, “the conference records show that the Bricker 
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Amendment controversy cast a long shadow over the ALI’s deliberations.”120 
Sloss suggests that the affirmation of the need to refer to the intent of treaty makers 
to address the question of self-execution is a legal fiction based on sloppy legal analysis.121 
The Second Restatement asserts that the doctrine of non-self-execution was consistent 
with Senate practice of “insert[ing] an understanding or reservation that the treaty should 
not be the supreme law of the land until further action is taken by Congress”—although 
“the Senate had never [up to that point] adopted an NSE reservation as a condition of its 
consent to treaty ratification.”122 Furthermore, the Second Restatement reflected a 
misapprehension of international law and in some places conflated international and 
domestic law.123 
Sloss suggests that the ALI reporters who drafted this section of the Second 
Restatement did not want to admit that their decision was influenced—or, perhaps, 
determined—by the Bricker Amendment controversy.124 Moreover, and more 
problematically from a legal perspective, if they had affirmed treaty supremacy in this 
context, “they would have been tacitly admitting that the Charter provided stronger 
protection against racial discrimination than did the Fourteenth Amendment.”125 Thus, 
asserting that treaties were not necessarily self-executing “helped judges preserve their 
faith in American exceptionalism by ducking the uncomfortable question of whether 
international human rights law provided stronger protection for human rights than does 
the U.S. Constitution.”126 
Sloss considers this shift to be deeply problematic. First, it emerged as the 
unintended consequence of a political response to U.N. human rights treaties rather than 
the accumulation of solid legal opinions.127 Second, the consequences of this change have 
been profound but largely imperceptible, to judges and policymakers as well as the 
American people.128 Third, the presumption that human rights treaties are non-self-
executing leaves American citizens unprotected by basic principles of universal human 
rights as defined in international law—and unaware of what we lack.129 Strangely, while 
the Third Restatement is the central focus of Supreme Law of the Land?, Sloss does not 
address it. Do the arguments that Sloss makes about the faulty foundations of treaty law 
hold for the Third Restatement as well as the Second? The lacuna is curious. 
Overall, The Death of Treaty Supremacy offers an extremely thorough analysis of 
the institutional context, scholarly commentary and details of relevant cases. Nonetheless, 
Sloss’s analysis may be biased by the way he selects cases for analysis. He selects for 
review cases that mention the terms he is interested in. For example, in his effort to 
determine the impact of the Fujii decision, he reviewed the “sixteen decisions between 
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1946 and 1965 in which a party raised a treaty-based claim or defense and one or more 
justices relied expressly on a treaty to support his opinion.”130 It’s possible that judges 
denied cert to cases that pertained to treaties, and that including those negative cases in his 
analysis would change the kinds of inferences he draws. 
In the current presidential administration, there has been a concerted effort to 
abrogate America’s treaty obligations. At the bottom of this effort is a belief that American 
interests at home and abroad are ill-served by cooperating with foreign powers. These 
policies represent the logical, or perhaps illogical, extension of the thinking underlying the 
“new federalist” era that began in the 1980s.131 As Margaret McGuinness puts it in her 
chapter, this approach rests on “a deep skepticism of the power of international law to 
solve global problems, a rejection of at least some of the normative foundations of the 
international legal order, a concern about the antidemocratic nature of international 
lawmaking, and a view that international law-making could be used to dilute state and 
local power in ways that were offensive to constitutional structure and the ideals of 
federalism.”132 In The Death of Treaty Supremacy, Sloss excavates the origins of these 
views and lays bare the faulty legal reasoning that underlies them. 
These two books offer extremely rich analyses of a wide range of issues surrounding 
treaty interpretation, only a few of which have I been able to explore here. Taken together, 
they provide considerable insight on how the legal terrain surrounding treaties has changed 
over time. The authors differ in terms of how they characterize the history of these changes. 
From the perspective of the authors in Supreme Law of the Land? concerns about 
competing jurisdiction between treaties and state law are part and parcel of federalism; 
moreover, it is possible to trace the current administration’s ideology back to the Founding, 
where federalist-inspired concerns about treaty obligations were central to the 
establishment of the republic. Sloss’s account emphasizes historical discontinuity and 
argues that current treaty doctrine is a politically-inspired aberration from longstanding 
precedent. Despite their differences, however, these two books concur that politics has 
overtaken the rule of law in troubling ways. 
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